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Abstract
There are many situations in which a customer’s proclivity to buy the product of any ﬁrm depends not
only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying
the same product. We model these situations as games in which ﬁrms compete for customers located in
a “social network”. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies exist in general. In the quasi-linear version
of the model, NE turn out to be unique and can be precisely characterized. If there are no a priori biases
between customers and ﬁrms, then there is a cut-oﬀ level above which high cost ﬁrms are blockaded at
an NE, while the rest compete uniformly throughout the network.
We also explore the relation between the connectivity of a customer and the money ﬁrms spend on him.
This relation becomes particularly transparent when externalities are dominant: NE can be characterized
in terms of the invariant measures on the recurrent classes of the Markov chain underlying the social
network.
Finally we consider convex (instead of linear) cost functions for the ﬁrms. Here NE need not be unique
as we show via an example. But uniqueness is restored if there is enough competition between ﬁrms or if
their valuations of clients are anonymous.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: A14, C72, D11, D21, L1, L2
Key words: Social network, game theory, Nash equilibrium, competition game on a social network.
1 Introduction
Consider a situation in which ﬁrms compete for customers located in a “social network”. Any customer i
has, of course, a higher proclivity to buy from ﬁrm α, if α lowers its price relative to those quoted by its
rivals. But another, quite independent, consideration also inﬂuences i’s decision. He is keen to conform to his
neighbors in the network. If the bulk of them purchase ﬁrm β’s product, then he is tempted to do likewise,
even though β may be charging a higher price than α. Customer i’s behavior thus involves a delicate balance
between the “externality” exerted by his neighbors and the more classical constituents of demand — the price
and the intrinsic quality of the product itself. Such externalities arise naturally in several contexts (see, e.g.,
[2],[7],[8],[4],[10],[9]).
The externality in demand clearly has signiﬁcant impact on the strategic interaction between the ﬁrms.
Firm α may spend resources marketing its product to i, not because α cares about i per se as a client, but
because i enjoys the position of a “hub” in the social network and so wields inﬂuence on other potential clients
that are of value to α. This in turn might instigate rival ﬁrms to spend further on i, since they wish to wean i
away from an excessive tilt toward α; causing α to increase its outlay on i even more, unleashing yet another
round of incremental expenditures on i.
The scenario invites us to model it as a non-cooperative game between the ﬁrms1. We take our cue from
[2],[7] which explore the optimal marketing strategy of a single ﬁrm, based on the “network value” of the
customers. Our innovation is to introduce competition between several ﬁrms in this setting. The model we
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1Customers are not strategic in our model. As in [2],[7], they are described in behavioristic terms.
1present is more general than that of [2],[7], though inspired by it. As in [2],[7], the social network, specifying
the ﬁeld of inﬂuence of each customer, is taken to be exogenous. Rival ﬁrms choose how much money to
spend on each customer. For any proﬁle of ﬁrms’ strategies, we show that the externality eﬀect stabilizes over
the social network and leads to unambiguous customer-purchases. A particular instance of our game arises
when ﬁrms compete for advertisement space on diﬀerent web-pages in the Internet (see Section 4.2).
Our main interest is in understanding the structure of the Nash Equilibria (NE) of the game between the
ﬁrms. Will they end up as regional monopolies, operating in separate parts of the network? Or will they
compete ﬁercely throughout? Which ﬁrms will enter the fray, and which will be blockaded? And how will
the money spent on a customer depend on his connectivity in the social network?
In Section 2 we describe a general non-linear model. So long as the externalities are a contraction, the
strategy-to-outcome map (and thus the game) is well-deﬁned. We show in Section 3 that NE exist in pure
strategies under the standard convexity assumptions.
Section 4 specializes to the quasi-linear case (and includes the model in [2], by setting # ﬁrms = 1). Here
we prove that NE are unique and can be easily computed in polynomial time via closed-form expressions
involving matrix inverses. It turns out that, provided that there are no a priori biases between ﬁrms and
customers, any NE has a cut-oﬀ cost: all ﬁrms whose costs are above the cut-oﬀ are blockaded, and the
rest enter the fray. Moreover there is no “regionalization” of ﬁrms in an NE: each active ﬁrm spends money
on every customer-node of the social network. The money spent on node i is related to the connectivity
of i, but the relation is somewhat subtle, though expressible in precise algebraic form. When externalities
are dominant, however, this relation becomes more transparent: NE can be characterized in terms of the
invariant measures on the recurrent classes of the Markov chain underlying the social network (see Section 6).
In particular suppose that the graph representing the social network is undirected and connected, all the
neighbors of any customer-node exert equal inﬂuence on him, and each company values all the nodes equally.
Then, at the NE, the money spent by a company on a node is proportional to the degree of the node.
In Section 5 we consider convex (rather than linear) cost functions, which include the ﬁxed-budget case
where each ﬁrm can spend freely up to an exogenously speciﬁed limit. NE need not be unique as we show via
an example in Section 5.1. But if there is “suﬃcient competition”, in that each ﬁrm has enough rivals whose
characteristics are nearby, then the uniqueness of NE is restored (see Section 5.3). Uniqueness also holds if
ﬁrms’ valuation of clients are anonymous (see Section 5.4), no matter how heterogenous their costs.
2 The General Model
There is a ﬁnite set A of ﬁrms and I of customers. We shall deﬁne a strategic game Γ among the ﬁrms. The
customers themselves are non-strategic in our model and described in behavioristic terms.
Firm α ∈ A can spend mα
i dollars on customer i ∈ I by way of marketing its product to him. This
could represent the discounts or special warranties oﬀered by α to i (in eﬀect lowering, for i, the ﬁxed price
that α has quoted for its product), or free add-ons of supplementary products, or simply the money spent on
advertising to i, etc. The strategy set of ﬁrm α may thus be viewed as2 RI
+, with elements mα ≡ (mα
i )i∈I.
Consider a proﬁle of ﬁrms’ strategies m ≡ (mα)α∈A ∈ R
I×A
+ . The proclivity of customer i to buy from
any particular ﬁrm α clearly depends on the proﬁle m, i.e., not just the expenditure of α but also that of its
rivals. We denote this proclivity by pα
i (m). One can think of pα
i (m) as the quantity of α’s product purchased
by i. Or, interpreting i to be a mass of customers such as those who visit a web page i, one can think of
pα
i (m) as the fraction of mass i that goes to α (or, equivalently, as the probability of i going to α). In either
setting, we take pi(m) ≡ (pα
i (m))α∈A ∈ [0,1]A. (When pα
i (m) is a quantity, there is a physical upper bound
on customer i’s capacity to consume which, w.l.o.g., is normalized to be 1).
The beneﬁt to any particular ﬁrm α from its clientele pα(m) ≡ (pα
i (m))i∈I is given by a function Uα :
[0,1]I → R.
There is also a cost Cα(mα) to α from incurring the expenditures mα. A natural candidate is Cα(mα) = P
i∈I mα
i , which simply totals the money spent by α. If the money is borrowed at interest rates that rise with
subsequent tranches, Cα(mα) is a piecewise linear, convex function of
P
i∈I mα
i . Or, if the ﬁrm can freely
spend up to some budget limit M, Cα(mα) is 0 if
P
i∈I mα
i ≤ M and ∞ otherwise. (This is still a convex
function). Our formulation of cost is general and includes these as special cases.
2Budget constraints on expenditures can be incorporated via cost functions (see Section 5 and Remark 1 in Section 3).
2Thus α’s payoﬀ in the game is given by
Πα(m) = Uα(pα(m)) − Cα(mα)
It remains to deﬁne the map from m to p(m).
Customer i’s proclivity pα
i to purchase from ﬁrm α is clearly positively correlated with α’s expenditure
mα




i )β∈I\{α}, of α’s rivals.
In addition we suppose that there is a positive externality exerted on i by the choice of any neighbor j:
increases in pα
j may boost pα
i . Negative cross-eﬀects of p
β
j on pα
i , for β 6= α, can be incorporated under certain
assumptions (which we make precise in Section 8.3), but for the bulk of the paper we suppose that they are
absent.
By way of an example of such an externality, think of ﬁrms’ products as specialized software. Then if
the users with whom i frequently interfaces (i.e., i’s ”neighbors”) have opted for α’s software, it will suit
i to also purchase predominantly from α in order to more smoothly interact with them. Or else suppose
the ﬁrms are in an industry focused on some fashion product. Denote by i’s neighbors the members of i’s
peer group with whom i is eager to conform. Once again, pα
i is positively correlated with pα
j where j is a
neighbor of i. Another typical instance comes from telephony: if most of the people, who i calls, subscribe
to service provider α and if α-to-α calls have superior connectivity compared with α-to-β calls, then i may
have incentive to subscribe to α even if α is costlier than β.
This externality gives rise to a natural dynamic: if, at some time t ≥ 0, others’ proclivities to purchase
are given by qα
−i(m,t) ≡ (qα
j (mj,t))j∈I\{i}, we will have qα
i (m,t + 1) = Fα
i (m,qα
−i(m,t)) for some function
Fα
i . (Here Fα
i (m,0) may be viewed as the initial proclivity at time 0, which is created by the marketing
expenditures m and does not take the externality into account.)
We shall suppose that the inﬂuence on i of his neighbors, albeit positive, is only partial, i.e., i puts positive
weight on the money mα




j by ∆ will no doubt boost qα
i , but by strictly less than ∆. We make the somewhat
weaker assumption that the function Fα




i (m, ˜ qα
−i)k ≤ Kkqα




where K < 1 and k · k denotes the maximum norm.
Since the Fα
i are contractions, this dynamic process settles very quickly (geometrically) to a steady state
pα(m) (the unique ﬁxed point ﬁxed point of Fα ≡ (Fα
i )i∈I)):
pα
i (m) = Fα
i (m,pα
−i(m)),for all i ∈ I,α ∈ A
We shall ignore in this paper the transient phase of the dynamic because if qα(m,t) is viewed as a proclivity
to purchase, then it will only be put into eﬀect once it becomes stable. Would a customer buy a new car
of a particular company when he is still in the process of revising his mind based on the feedback from his
neighbors? On the other hand, if qα(m,t) represents actual purchases that are occurring repeatedly in small
quantities, then the aggregate purchase in the steady state overwhelms the small volume traded during the
very short transient phase.
In either scenario a ﬁrm need only worry about the steady state behavior of customers in evaluating its
payoﬀ. It thus seems natural to suppose that the outcome engendered by a strategy proﬁle m is the unique
ﬁxed point pα(m) of Fα(m,·). This fully deﬁnes the map from m to p(m), and thereby the strategic game Γ
between the ﬁrms.
However, at this level of abstraction, it is hard to imagine that ﬁrms can come to know the functions
(Fα)α∈A. The social interaction between customers tends to be quite subtle and it is not easy for ﬁrms to
generally predict the outcome with any degree of accuracy. But there are scenarios in which the interaction
gets channelled through networks that are common knowledge. In particular this is possible in the wired
world where the interaction may be tracked online and made explicit. (See for example [8],[1] as well as
Section 4.2.) Then (Fα)α∈A can become “manifest” to the companies, enabling them to compute the eﬀect
of the interaction, and thus to participate in the kind of game we are describing. Indeed we will focus on
networks in most of our analysis.
3In Section 6 we examine the scenario when externalities become dominant
33 Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Recall that a strategy proﬁle m is called a Nash Equilibrium4 (NE) of the game Γ if
Πα(m) ≥ Πα(˜ mα,m−α) ∀ ˜ mα ∈ RI
+
for all α ∈ A (where m−α ≡ (mβ)β∈I\{α}).
It turns out that NE exist in our model under quite general conditions which we list below.
AI: The cost function Cα : RI
+ → R+ is continuous, convex and strictly increasing5.
AII: The beneﬁt function Uα : [0,1]I → R is continuous, concave and increasing.
AIII: The externality function Fα
i (m,q) = Fα
i (mα,m−α,qα
−i) is continuous if m >> 06; and is concave and
increasing in mα for every ﬁxed m−α,qα
−i. Furthermore Fα
i is a contraction in q for every ﬁxed m.
Our last assumption has to do with the possible discontinuity of the function Fα
i (m,q) as mi ≡ (mα
i )α∈A →
0. We require that, for each customer i, there be at least two distinct ﬁrms who value i, so that the competition
between them will ensure that the total money spent on i is positive in any NE. The intuition is that, if mi
is too small, either of the two ﬁrms could spend a “sliver” on i, which costs very little, but is nevertheless
overwhelmingly more than other ﬁrms’ expenditures on i, and thus is able to “buy out” i, contradicting that
it has optimized. Formally, denoting by m
−τ
−i the vector m with the component mτ
i suppressed, we have
AIV For each customer i, there exist two distinct ﬁrms α and β such that:


















∞ for all τ0 ∈ A\{τ}, and mτ
i ≤ mτ
0
i for some τ0 ∈ A\{τ}.
To interpret the second part of AIV, take τ = α and consider a unilateral deviation by α wherein α
increases mα
i to mα
i +δ. Since all β ∈ A\{α} have expenditures m
β
i on i that are vanishingly small compared
to the expenditure mα
i +δ made by α, ﬁrm α must have 100% of the “marketing impact” on i in the limit, on
account of its deviation. On the other hand, it has less than 50% of the impact, prior to its deviation, since
its expenditure is over-matched by at least one rival ﬁrm. But the jump from 50% to 100% is non-negligible
since — as was said — i is not guided solely by the externality eﬀect of his neighbors, and since the marketing
impact aﬀects his proclivities by (say) at least θ > 0. The bracketed term [...] is thus of the order of θ/2
and so the whole term goes to inﬁnity like θ/2δ as δ → 0. Our assumption is weaker, allowing for the total
probability of purchase across all ﬁrms by customer i to go to zero (suﬃciently slowly) as the aggregate
expenditure mi → 0.
We are ready to state our main existence result.
Theorem 1. Assume AI, AII, AIII, AIV. Then a Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists in the game Γ. Moreover,
if m is a NE, mi > 0 for all i ∈ I.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remarks
4Throughout we conﬁne attention to “pure” strategies.
5i.e., if x ≥ y,x 6= y imply g(x) ≥ g(y), we say that g is increasing. If the last inequality is strict, we say that g is strictly
increasing.
6i.e., each component of m is strictly positive
4(1) Theorem 1 remains intact (with obvious amendments in the proof) if we drop the strictly increasing
property of Cα and replace it by the requirement that α’s expenditures must lie in a compact, convex subset
Sα of RI
+. (Strictness is only used to bound the expenditures of α.) This is tantamount to taking Cα to be
convex and continuous on Sα and −∞ on RI
+\Sα.
(2) If Fα
i is continuous in m (even when m → 0) then AIV can be dropped. In need only be postulated
for those i where continuity fails. Existence of NE remains intact, but now the total money spent on a client
may be zero.
4 The Quasi-Linear Model
4.1 The Data of the Economy
We turn to a quasi-linear version of our model, which is particularly transparent, and in which NE are not
only unique but can be precisely characterized. The social network now has a concrete representation in terms
of a directed, weighted graph G = (I,E,w). The nodes of G are identiﬁed with the set of customers I. Each
directed edge (i,j) ∈ E ≡ I × I has weights (wα
ij)α∈A, where wα
ij ≥ 0 is a measure of the inﬂuence j has on
i, with regard to purchases from α. Precisely, if pα = (pα
j )j∈I denotes the proclivities of purchases, then the




j . We assume that
P
j∈I wα
ij ≤ 1, for all i ∈ I and α ∈ A. (One
may view (I,Eα,wα) as the social network relevant for ﬁrm α, with Eα = {(i,j) ∈ E : wα
ij > 0}).
Let us now make explicit how ﬁrms’ expenditures, in conjunction with the externality eﬀect, determine
purchases in the social network.
Fix a proﬁle m ≡ (mβ)β∈A ≡ ((m
β
j )j∈I)β∈A of ﬁrms’ strategies.
For any ﬁrm α and customer i, let γα
i (mi) ∈ [0,1] denote the proclivity with which i is initially impelled
to buy from ﬁrm α on account of the direct “marketing impact”, where (recall) mi ≡ (m
β
i )β∈A gives the
expenditures induced on i by m.
Denoting (m
β
i )β∈A\{α} by m
−α




i ) be strictly increasing
in mα
i for any ﬁxed m
−α
i . We assume this and a little bit more: γα
i is also concave in mα
i for ﬁxed m
−α
i ,
reﬂecting the diminishing returns to α of incremental dollars spent on i.
A canonical example we have in mind is γα
i (mi) = mα




i ) (with γα
i (0) ≡ 0). In
short, i’s probability of purchase from diﬀerent ﬁrms is simply set proportional to the money they spend on
him7.
Customer i weights the two factors (i.e., the externality impact and the marketing impact) by θα
i and
1 − θα
i , where 0 ≤ θα
i < 1. Thus, given a strategy proﬁle m, the ﬁnal steady-state proclivities of purchase
p(m) ≡ (pα(m))α∈A ∈ [0,1]I×A, where pα ≡ (pα
j (m))j∈I, must satisfy
pα
i (m) = (1 − θα
i )γα







for all α ∈ A and i ∈ I.
The fact that (1) has a unique solution follows, of course from our analysis of the general model, once one
observes that the map (pα





j )i∈I is a contraction since θα




Deﬁne the I × I-matrices: I ≡ identity, Θα ≡ the diagonal matrix with Θα
ii = θα
i and Wα ≡ the matrix
with entries wα
ij. Then equation (1) reads
pα(m) = (I − Θα)γα(m) + ΘαWαpα(m).
Since I − ΘαWα is invertible (its row sums being less than 1), we obtain
pα(m) = (I − ΘαWα)−1(I − Θα)γα(m).
7More generally, γα
i (mi) = (mα
i /mi)(mi)r where 0 ≤ r < 1. We may think of (mi)r as the “market penetration”, which
rises with the total money spent. Notice pα
i (m) is eﬀectively bounded. This is so because the derivative of γα
i (w.r.t. mα
i ) goes
to zero as mα
i → ∞, while the cost of mα
i is ﬁxed — see later — at cα
i > 0, bounding mα
i (and so γα
i ). (If γα
i (mi) is to be a
probability, one must amend (mi)r to max{(mr
i),1} or a suitably smoothed version of this function.)
5It still remains to specify Uα, Cα and γα














j ≥ 0 and cα
j > 0 for all j ∈ I. This gives
Πα(m) = [uα]>(I − ΘαWα)−1(I − Θα)γα(m) − [cα]>mα (2)
where uα and cα are the column vectors (uα
j )j∈I, (cα
j )j∈I and > stands for the transpose operation. Denote
vα ≡ [uα]>(I − ΘαWα)−1(I − Θα) (3)






i (mi) − cα
i mα
i ) (4)
Our key assumption on γα








i.e., ﬁrm α is aﬀected only by the aggregate8 expenditure of its rivals.











i ) is continuous; and, furthermore, it



















i ,mi) ≡ φα
i (rα




i /mi.) We suppose that
λα
i is strictly decreasing in rα
i and in mi (5)
for ﬁxed mi and rα
i respectively. This condition reﬂects the diminishing returns on incremental dollars spent
by α; it also states that an incremental dollar of α counts for less when α’s rivals have put in more money.







which is the analogue of AIV in our quasi-linear world.
Note that both conditions (5) and (6) are satisﬁed by our canonical example and its variants in footnote 8.
Finally we assume that for each customer there exist at least two ﬁrms that value him:
∀i ∈ I,∃α,α0 ∈ A such that : α 6= α0 and uα
i > 0 and uα
0
i > 0. (7)
8Aggregation is a form of anonymity that is common to many markets. It says, in essence, that if a ﬁrm pretends to be two
entities and splits its expenditure between them, this has no eﬀect on other ﬁrms. This form of “anonymity toward numbers” is
tantamount to aggregation.
64.2 An Example: Competition for Advertisement on the Web
Think of the web as a set I of pages, each of which corresponds to a distinct node of a graph. A directed arc
(i,j) means that there is a link from page j to page i.
At the beginning of any period, two kind of “surfers” visit page i. There are those who transit to i from
other pages j in the web. Furthermore, there are “fresh arrivals”, entering the web for the ﬁrst time, via page
i at rate ψi.
At the end of the period, a fraction (1 − θi) of the population on the page i exits the web, while the
remaining fraction θi continues surﬁng (where 0 ≤ θi < 1). The weight on (i,j), which we denote ωij, gives
the probability that a representative surfer, who is on page j and who continues surﬁng, moves on to page i
(or, alternatively, the fraction of surfers on page j who transit to page i). Thus
P
i∈I ωij = 1 for all j ∈ I.
Companies α ∈ A compete for advertisement on the web pages. If they spend mi ≡ (mα
i )α∈A dollars to
place their ads on page i, they get “visibility” (time, space) on page i in proportion to the money spent. Thus
the probability that a surfer views company α’s ad on page i is mα
i /mi = γα
i (mα
i ,mi)
The payoﬀ of a company is the aggregate “eyeballs” of its advertisement obtained, in the long run (i.e.,
in the steady state).
To compute the payoﬀ, let us ﬁrst examine the population distribution of surfers across nodes in the
unique steady state of the system.
Denote by φi denote the arrival rate of surfers (of both kinds) to page i. Then, in a steady state, we must
have




for all i ∈ I. In matrix notation, this is
φ = ψ + ΩΘφ
where φ ≡ (φi)i∈I and ψ ≡ (ψi)i∈I are column vectors, Θ is the diagonal I × I matrix with entries θii = θi,
and Ω is the I × I matrix with entries ωij. Hence
φ = (I − ΩΘ)−1ψ





which ﬁts the format of (4).
More generally, suppose surfers have bounded recall of length k. Then ﬁrm α will only care about any





The expression for vα
i will become complicated when the recall k > 1 (more so, if discounting of past memory
is incorporated). But the payoﬀs in all these cases still ﬁt the format of (4).
Generalizing in a diﬀerent direction, suppose that surfers at page i, who have spent t periods in the
web, exit at rate θt
i for t = 1,2.... Denote by Θt the diagonal matrix whose iith entry is θt
i. Then φ =
(I + ΩΘ1 + ΩΘ2ΩΘ1 + ...)ψ, which is well-deﬁned provided we assume θt
i ≤ ∆ < 1 for some ∆ (for all t,i).
This retains the format of (4) though the expression for vα
i becomes even more complicated. One could also
incorporate bounded recall in this setting, without departing from (4).
Notice that the “externality” in the above examples is reﬂected in the movement of traﬃc across pages in
the web. Also notice that the games derived are anonymous i.e. vα
i = vi for all α. Such games will be singled
out for special attention later.
74.3 Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 2. Under hypotheses (5), (6), (7), there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium in the quasi-linear model.





i ) is decreasing in mα
i (for any ﬁxed
m
−α
i ), i.e., γα
i is concave in its ﬁrst variable. Thus, in conjunction with (6), and (7), all the requirements of




i > 0 for all i ∈ I9.
Suppose m ≡ (mα)α∈I and η ≡ (ηα)α∈I are two NE’s. Denote rα
i ≡ mα






i etc.). It suﬃces to show that mi = ηi and rα
i = sα
i for all α ∈ A and all i ∈ I.




i ,mi) = cα
i if mα




i ,mi) ≤ cα
i if mα




i ,ηi) = cα
i if ηα




i ,ηi) ≤ cα
i if ηα
i = 0 (11)
Fix i ∈ I and suppose w.l.o.g. that mi ≤ ηi.
Step 1: sα
i ≤ rα
i for all α ∈ A.
Proof: First note that, by (4), vα
i = 0 implies mα
i = 0 in any NE. Let sα
i > 0 (otherwise the claim is
vacuously true) and so we must have vα
i > 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that sα
i > rα
i . Since ηi ≥ mi,
condition (5) on λα
i imply λα
i (sα
i ,ηi) < λα
i (rα
i ,mi). But (8), (9) and (10) and the fact that vα
i > 0 together
yield λα
i (sα
i ,ηi) ≥ λα
i (rα
i ,mi), a contradiction.
Step 2: sα
i = rα
i for all α ∈ A.
Proof: Immediate from step 1, since
P
α∈A sα




Step 3: mi = ηi
Proof: Suppose ηi > mi (by assumption we already have ≥). By step 2, and condition (ii) on λα
i , we have




i = 1 there exists β0 such that r
β
0






i , so both
(10) and (8) hold, hence LHS of (10) = LHS of (8), a contradiction. This proves step 3.
Since the choice of i was arbitrary, we have shown that ηi = mi and rα
i = sα
i for all α ∈ A and all i ∈ I.
Thus m = η, establishing the uniqueness of NE.
4.4 Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 3. Consider our canonical case: γα
i (mi) = mα
i /mi (other closed-form expressions for the γα
i will




i (see (3) for the deﬁnition of vα
i ). For convenience denote this order κ1
i ≤ κ2













9For better perspective, here is an alternative proof that mi > 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that mi = 0 for some i. By
assumption, there exists α such that uα
i > 0. By (3),





from which it follows that [u]> is being multiplied by a matrix with non negative entries and strictly positive diagonal entries.
Hence vα
i > 0.
Let ﬁrm α unilaterally deviate from m by spending a small δ on customer i. By (4), his change in payoﬀ is
vα
i γα
i (δ,0) − cα
i δ
which, using (7), becomes positive for small enough δ, contradicting that m is an NE. We conclude that mi > 0 for all i ∈ I.
10Since mi > 0 and ηi > 0, and the γα
i are diﬀerentiable away from zero, these conditions can be invoked.


















Firms ki + 1,...,n put no money on customer i.
Proof: Note that λα
i (rα
i ,mi) = (1 − rα













i = 0 (15)
It follows at once that, if rα
i > 0, then r
β
i > 0 whenever κ
β
i ≤ κα
i . Hence we only need check that: (i) condition
(14) holds for 1 ≤ α ≤ ki; (ii) condition (15) holds for ki + 1 ≤ α ≤ n; and (iii) rα
i > 0 for 1 ≤ α ≤ ki.













And (13) and (16) imply
1 − rα










Then (i) follows from the above equation and (16).
It suﬃces to show (ii) for α = ki + 1, since LHS of (15) = 1/mi for all α ≥ ki + 1 (on account of rα
i = 0)
and since RHS of (15) rises with α.

















which, together with (16), implies (ii).



































for 1 ≤ α ≤ ki. Then, by (13), mα
i > 0, i.e., rα
i > 0 for 1 ≤ α ≤ ki verifying (iii).
According to Theorem 3, companies α can be ranked, at each customer-node i, according to their “eﬀective
costs” κα
i . The money mα
i , spent by α on i, is a strictly decreasing function of κα
i upto some threshold, after
which it becomes zero.
Theorem 3 conﬁrms the obvious intuition that mα
i = 0 if vα
i = 0 (i.e., κα
i = ∞, recalling that cα
i > 0 by
assumption). It also brings to light a diﬀerent, and more important, feature of NE. First recall that, by (3),
vα
i may well be highly positive even though the direct value uα
i of customer i to company α is zero. This is
because vα
i incorporates the network value of i, stemming from the possibility that i may be exerting a big
externality on other customers whom α does directly value. Now, since κα
i falls with vα
i , (13) reveals that α
may be spending a huge mα
i on i even when uα
i is zero, purely on account of the network value of i.
4.5 Impact of the Social Network on Nash Equilibrium
To get a better feel for Theorem 3, it might help to consider some examples.
Suppose there are ﬁve customers {1,2,...,5} and four ﬁrms {α1,α2,β1,β2}. The customers are arranged
in a linear network, with i connected to i + 1 via an undirected (i.e., directed both ways) edge, for i =





















25) = (0.5,0,0.5,0,0) etc., for any company
γ. Further suppose θ
γ
i = 0.1 and c
γ
i = 1 for all γ and i. Finally let uα1 = uα2 = (1,1,0,0.1,0.1) and
uβ1 = uβ2 = (0.1,0.1,0,1,1). Formula (3) yields vα1 = vα2 = (0.950,0.998,0.055,0.102,0.095) and vβ1 =
vβ2 = (0.095,0.102,0.055,0.998,0.950) and hence κα1 = κα2 = (1.053,1.002,18.182,9.779,10.514) and κβ1 =
κβ2 = (10.514,9.779,18.182,1.002,1.053). It follows from Theorem 3 that ﬁrms α1 and α2 will put no money
on customers 4,5 and positive money on the rest; while ﬁrms β1 and β2 will put no money on customers 1,2
and positive money on the rest. In eﬀect, there will “regionalization” of customers into α-territory {1,2,3}
and β-territory {3,4,5}. The only overlap is customer 3, who is of zero direct value u
γ
3 to all ﬁrms γ and yet
is being equally targeted by them, purely on account of his network value.
The situation dramatically changes when the game is anonymous. Assume that there are no a priori biases
between ﬁrms and customers: wα
ij = wij and θα
i = θi for all α ∈ A and i,j ∈ I. It then follows from (3) that
the game is anonymous, i.e., vα
i = vi for all α and i. To simplify the analysis, further assume: cα
i = cα. Our
analysis in Section 4.4 immediately implies that we can rank the ﬁrms, independently of i, by their costs; say
(after relabeling)
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn
At the Nash Equilibrium a subset of low-cost ﬁrms {1,...,k} will be active (see (12), while all the higher-












Each active ﬁrm α ∈ {1,...,k} will spend an amount mα
i > 0 on all the nodes i ∈ I that is proportional to












which also shows that mα ≥ mβ if α < β, i.e., lower cost ﬁrms spend more money than their higher-cost





Thus there is no regionalization of customer territory at NE, with ﬁrms operating in disjoint pieces of the
social network. Instead, ﬁrms that are not blockaded, compete uniformly throughout the social network.
105 Uniqueness with Convex Costs
Consider the quasi-linear model but with convex, instead of linear, cost functions Cα. We will no longer








is admitted by us, as Cα is still convex. (One may imagine here that the marketing division of each company
α has been allocated a budget Mα to spend freely as it likes.)
5.1 Multiple Nash Equilibria
Unfortunately it is no longer true that NE are unique. Consider the following simple ﬁxed-budget example.
There are two customers and two ﬁrms. The budgets of the two ﬁrms are identical: M1 = M2 = 1. Suppose
v2
1 = v1
1 = 1, v2
2 = 0.02 and v1
2 = 500. (The uα
i can be adjusted, given any wα
ij > 0 and 0 ≤ θα < 1, to guarantee
that the vα
i take on these values.) Finally take our canonical marketing function, i.e., γα
i (m) = mα
i /mi if
mi > 0 and 0 otherwise. By Theorem 1 (see Remark 1) there exists NE; and, if m is any NE, we must have
m1 > 0 and m2 > 0. Now if mα
i = 0 for any α and i then the rival ﬁrm β can reduce m
β
i and shift money to
the other client j 6= i, improving its payoﬀ. We conclude that mα
i > 0 for i = 1,2 and α = 1,2. Therefore m
























2)2 ≡ c2 (18)
along with m >> 0, m1
1 + m1
2 = M1 and m2
1 + m2
2 = M1 (Here cα can be interpreted as the marginal utility
of a dollar for company α at the NE).






































i ) = 0 (22)
Clearly if (c1,c2) solves(22), then so does (λc1,λc2) for any λ > 0. So consider (22) with c2 = 1, which
yields (substituting our values for vα
i and Mα) a cubic equation in c1 with three positive roots, whose
approximate values are ˜ c1 = 1.087109, ˜ c1 = 47.1973, and ˜ c1 = 24800.020967164826. But in order to satisfy






1 + ˜ c1
+
10
500 + 0.02˜ c1
)
Thus we get three distinct pairs (c1,c2) ≈ (0.271305,1.808711), (c1,c2) ≈ (0.96071,0.0203552) and
(c1,c2) ≈ (125,0.0050402) which give (via (19) and (20)) three distinct η, ˜ η and η as NE:
η1
1 ≈ 0.919868, η1
2 = 1 − η1
1
11η2
1 ≈ 0.999996, η2




1 ≈ 0.0211485, ˜ η1
2 = 1 − ˜ η1
1
˜ η2
1 ≈ 0.998152, ˜ η2




1 ≈ 3.2256 × 10−7, η1
2 = 1 − η1
1
η2
1 ≈ 0.0079995, η2
2 = 1 − η2
1
(The reader may numerically check that η, ˜ η and η are indeed approximate solutions to (17) and (18).)
Notice that the two companies have widely disparate valuations of client 2 in our counter example: v1
2 = 500
and v2
2 = 0.02. Curiously, if we replicate each company, the counterexample disappears and uniqueness of
NE is restored. More generally uniqueness holds if, for each company there are “suﬃciently many” other
companies whose characteristics are “nearby”11. Of course the words in quotes must be made precise (which
we shall do in Section 5.3).
But the counter example does show the need to impose additional constraints on the marketing functions
γα
i to guarantee uniqueness of NE, a matter to which we now turn.
5.2 Uniqueness with Multi-Concavity
We shall ﬁrst present an abstract result and later bring it to bear on our model. Let Sα ⊂ RI
+ be the (closed,
convex) strategy-set of α ∈ A. Given a strategy proﬁle (mβ)β∈A ∈ ×β∈ASβ, suppose the payoﬀ to any ﬁrm
α depends on his action sα and the aggregate
P
β∈A\{α} mβ of others’ actions. So we may take α’s payoﬀ
Πα to be deﬁned on Sα × RI
+. It will be convenient to extend the domain of Πα to RI × RI
+ by putting
Πα(mα,.) = −∞ if mα 6∈ Sα. Assume Πα(mα
i ,m
−α
−i ) is concave in mα
i for any ﬁxed m
−α
−i , and let ∂mα
i Πα(m)
denote its superdiﬀerential w.r.t. mα
i .
Theorem 4. Suppose for all α and i, the superdiﬀerential ∂mα
i Πα(m) is a correspondence hα
i (mα
i ,mi,mα)
that is strictly decreasing in mα
i and decreasing in both mi and mα12. Then there is at most one Nash
equilibrium.
The proof is based on the following lemma which may be of independent interest. Let B be an I × A
matrix with entries Bα





i and Bi ≡
P
α Bα
i . A cell (i,α) is said to be
positive for B if Bi ≥ 0, B
α
≥ 0 and Bα
i > 0. It is said to be negative for B if it is positive for −B. Finally
it is said to be signed if it is either positive or negative for B.
Lemma 1. Any non zero matrix B has a signed cell.
Proof: Suppose A has no signed cell. Let A+ ≡ {α ∈ A : B
α
≥ 0}, A− ≡ A − A+,; and similarly
I+ ≡ {i ∈ I : Bi ≥ 0}, I− ≡ I − I+.
Since B has no positive cell,
Bα
i ≤ 0 for all α ∈ A+ and i ∈ I+ (23)
Similarly, since B has no negative cell,
Bα
i ≥ 0 for all α ∈ A− and i ∈ I− (24)



















11As we expand the neighborhood of characteristics that deﬁnes “nearby”, we will need to put in more companies in that
neighborhood.
12A correspondence Λ(x,y,z) is said to be decreasing in x if v ∈ Λ(x,y,z), w ∈ Λ(x0,y,z), x0 > x together imply v ≥ w. If
the last inequality is strict, we say that Λ is strictly decreasing in x.






i . By (23) this is only possible if P
A− Bα





i ≥ 0, a contradiction.
A symmetric argument shows that I− = ∅. So, by (23), all elements Bα
i are non-positive and their row
sums Bi are non-negative. This is only possible if B = 0.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let m ∈ RI×A and η ∈ RI×A be two NE of the game. Deﬁne the matrix
B = η − m. We shall show that it has no signed cell, so that by the lemma, B = 0, proving m = η.
Suppose i,α is a positive cell for B, then we have mα
i < ηα
i , mi ≤ ηi, mα ≤ ηα. By the strictly decreasing
property of hα
i in its ﬁrst variable, if x ∈ hα
i (mα
i ,mi,mα) and y ∈ hα
i (ηα
i ,ηi,ηα), we must have x > y. But this
contradicts the ﬁrst order conditions of NE, according to which 0 ∈ hα
i (mα




By a symmetric argument, B has no negative cell.
To apply Theorem 4 to our model, we focus on the case when costs are convex in total expenditure and






i (mi) − Cα
i (mα)
(We shall refer to this in brief as “the quasi-linear model with convex costs”.)
The superdiﬀerential of −Cα is clearly decreasing in mα since Cα is convex. It therefore suﬃces to check
that the superdiﬀerential of γα
i can be expressed as a correspondence of two variables mα
i and mi, which is
strictly decreasing in mα
i and decreasing in mi.




















is non-positive if, and only if, mα
i ≤ mi/2.
In the light of this, Theorem 4 (or, rather, its proof) immediately yields
Corollary 1. In the quasi-linear model with convex costs and canonical marketing, there is at most one NE
in the region
Ω ≡ {m : mα
i ≤ mi/2 for all α ∈ A and i ∈ I}
No wonder that, in the counterexample of Section 5.1, the NE were not contained in Ω.
5.3 Competition Restores Uniqueness
Throughout this section we conﬁne ourselves to the ﬁxed-budget model with the canonical marketing function,
which was also the context of the counterexample.
We shall show that, with “enough competition” no NE can be outside Ω. This will guarantee uniqueness
of NE (by Corollary 1).
First consider the time-honored device of creating competition by replicating the companies, i.e., for any
α, there is a replica (twin) ˜ α with identical characteristics (θα = θ˜ α, uα = u˜ α, Wα = W ˜ α, Mα = M ˜ α). It
suﬃces to show that replicas act identically in any NE, for then obviously m ∈ Ω.
We shall prove this by contradiction. Suppose m is an NE with mα 6= m˜ α. Since 13 P
i∈I mα
i = Mα =
M ˜ α =
P
i∈I m˜ α
i , there exist clients i and j such that rα
i > r˜ α
i and rα
j < r˜ α
j (where, recall, rα
i ≡ mα
i /mi etc.).
13Clearly both the companies will spend all their money at any NE, since each puts positive value on at least one customer-node.
13The ﬁrst order conditions of NE are
vα




















i > 0, we have mα
i > 0 and so the LHS of (25) must equal cα ≡ the marginal utility of a dollar to α
at the NE. But RHS of (25) is at most cα, proving (25). A similar argument can be made for (26).)
But vα
i = v˜ α
i and vα
j = v˜ α
j by (3). So LHS of (26)> LHS of (25) ≥ RHS of (25) > RHS of (26), contradicting
(26).
This establishes uniqueness of NE under replication.
But it is not necessary to have exact replicas. It suﬃces to assume that, for each company α, there are
suﬃciently many rivals whose characteristics are “close enough” to those of α. (As we relax the notion of
“closeness”, we will need to put in more rivals.) Precisely, we have:
Theorem 5. Consider the quasi-linear model with ﬁxed positive budgets14 and canonical marketing. For any




j : j ∈ I,v
β
j > 0} and vβ
max = max{v
β
j : j ∈ I,v
β
j > 0}. Fix an integer n ≥ 2.
Assume that, for each α ∈ A there exists Aα(n) ⊂ A\{α} such that v
β
i = 0 if and only if vα
i = 0 for all
β ∈ Aα(n) and all i ∈ I. Furthermore assume, for every α ∈ A, that
(i) |Aα(n)| ≥ n






i ≤ k2 for all β ∈ Aα(n) and all i ∈ {j ∈ I : vα
j > 0}.




max)Mβ for all β ∈ Aα(n)
Then Γ has a unique NE.
Proof. By Corollary 1, we need only verify that, if m is an NE, then m ∈ Ω, i.e., rα
i ≤ 1/2 for all α and i.
Suppose some rα
i > 1/2. Then, clearly, there exists β ∈ Aα(n) such that r
β
i < 1/2n




Proof. It suﬃces to show that β has more money left to spend16 on I\{i} than does α:
Mα − mα



































14Leading to convex costs (see the beginning of Section 5).
15Recall that (u
β
j )j∈I 6= 0 by assumption, hence (see (3)) we have (v
β
j )j∈I 6= 0.
16Since, v
β





14Consider any k ∈ I\{i} such that r
β
k > 0 (we shall deal shortly with the case that no such k exists). The ﬁrst




















































Summing over all k such that r
β


















k = 0 for all k ∈ I\{i}, we must have mi ≥ Mβ and therefore the above inequality still holds.)




















On the other hand, condition (iii) says











i > Mα − Mβ
establishing the claim.




























which contradicts (ii)(a). We conclude that rα
i ≤ 1/2 for every α and i, proving the theorem.




i > 1/2, r
β
i < 1/2n; (b) r
β
j < 1 since at least two companies bid on any customer-node in







j > 0; (d) both mi and mj are positive by Theorem 1. These conditions together imply that the LHS
and RHS of (25) and (26) are all positive.
155.4 Anonymous Valuations Restore Uniqueness
NE are unique even with heterogeneous convex costs and marketing functions that are more general than
our canonical example, provided that companies’ valuations of clients are identical: vα
i = vi for all α and i.
This is not an unnatural assumption. It holds when wα
ij and θα
i are invariant of α, as in our examples in
Section 4.2.
Suppose that costs are given by diﬀerentiable and convex functions of total expenditure: Cα(mα) ≡
Cα(mα) for all α ∈ A. Further suppose that the marketing impact of α on i can be factored in terms of i’s
expenditure mα
i and the total expenditure mi.







(when mi > 0), where fi is strictly increasing and λα is strictly decreasing. (Recall rα
i ≡ mα
i /mi.)
Note that, in our canonical case, λα
i (rα
i ,mi) = (1−rα
i )/mi and so (AV) is satisﬁed. The related examples
in footnote 7 also satisfy (AV).
Theorem 6. Suppose vα
i = vi for all α and i, and that assumption AV holds. Then there exists a unique
Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: Let m be an NE. As argued in the proof of Theorem 3, mi > 0 for all i ∈ I, so that the derivatives
λα
i (rα
i ,mi) are well deﬁned.
Step 1: rα
i = rα
j ≡ rα for all i ∈ I,j ∈ I and α ∈ A.
Proof: Suppose rα
i > rα



























































But, by (AV), LHS of (31) < 1 and RHS of (31) > 1, a contradiction.
Let η be another NE and deﬁne sα
i ≡ ηα
i /ηi. As shown in Step 1, sα
i = sα
j ≡ sα for all α ∈ A and i,j ∈ I.
Step 2: rα = sα for all α ∈ A.
Proof: Suppose not. W.l.o.g. let m ≥ η. Clearly there exists i ∈ I such that mi ≥ ηi and (since P
β ∈A rβ = 1 =
P















But, since rα > sα and mi ≥ ηi, (AV) implies λα(rα) < λα(sα) and fi(mi) ≥ fi(ηi), contradicting the last
displayed inequality.
Step 3: m = η.
Proof: Suppose w.l.o.g. m > η. Then there exists i such that mi > ηi. Also there clearly exists α such
that rα > 0. Now, consider the ﬁrst order conditions (32) and (33). Since rα = sα by Step 2, RHS of (32) ≥
RHS of (33), which implies fi(ηi) ≥ fi(mi). Thus ηi ≥ mi since fi is strictly increasing by (AV). This is a
contradiction.
Steps 1, 2 and 3 imply that m = η, proving Theorem 4.
5.4.1 Structure of Nash Equilibrium
It is natural to consider the case where the marketing impact is an anonymous function of expenditures, as




i ≡ λi for all α,β and i.
Also assume that λi is concave and increasing in mα
i , as in Section 4.1. In this event, even without the
factorization of AV, we can describe an interesting structural feature of NE (though we do not know if they
are unique).
Recall that ξα(mα) = (d/dmα)Cα(mα).
Theorem 7. Consider the model stated above. Let m be any NE. Denote I(α) = {i ∈ I : mα
i > 0}. There
is an ordering α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ... ≤ αn of the ﬁrms such that I(α1) ⊂ I(α2) ⊂ ... ⊂ I(αn). In other words the
clientele of active ﬁrms are always nested.
Proof:
First we shall show
mα
i > 0 ⇒ m
β
i > 0
for all β,α such that ξβ(0) ≤ ξα(0). Suppose, to the contrary, that mα
i > 0 and m
β
i = 0 for some β such that
ξβ(0) ≤ ξα(0). The ﬁrst order conditions for α and β become
viλi(rα




i /mi > 0. Since ξα(mα) > ξα(0) ≥ ξβ(0), we have λi(rα
i ,mi) > λi(0,mi) contradicting that
λi is increasing as in Section 4.1. The theorem now easily follows.
6 When Externalities become Dominant
6.1 A Markov Chain Perspective
It is often is too expensive for a ﬁrm α to provide meaningful subsidies mα
i to each customer i. Indeed the
marketing division of ﬁrm α is typically allocated a ﬁxed budget Mα and, if there is a large population of
customers, then the individual expenditures mα
i must perforce be small. In this event, customers’ behavior is
predominantly driven by the externality eﬀect of their neighbors. We can capture the situation in our model
by supposing that all the θα
i are close to 1.
Thus we are led to inquire about the limit of the NE as the θα
i −→ 1 for all α and i. (In this scenario we
will also obtain a more transparent relation between NE and the graphical structure of the social network.)




ij = 1 for all i and α. Let us consider a Markov chain with I as the state space and
Wα as the transition matrix (i.e., wα
ij is the probability of going from i to j.). Let it denote the (random)
17state of the chain at date t = 0,1,2,.... Suppose that, upon arrival in state it, a choice Lt ∈ {Stop,Move}
is made with Prob(Lt = Move) = θα
it. Let T be the ﬁrst time Lt = Stop and consider the random variable
γα
iT(m). If φα(i) denotes the conditional expectation E[γα
iT(m)|i0 = i], then clearly the I-dimensional vector
φα, substituted for pα(m), satisﬁes equation (1). Since this equation has a unique solution, it must be the
case that pα(m) = φα.
Recall that each vector uα is positive, and so we may write uα = yαξα, where yα > 0 is a scaler and ξα is
a probability distribution on I. The weighted sum [uα]>p(m) is then equal to yα P
i∈I ξα
i φα(i) which in turn
can be expressed as yαE[γα
iT(m)], provided we assume that the probability distribution of the initial state i0
is ξα. Therefore the vector vα/yα is just the probability distribution of iT initializing the Markov chain at
ξα.
We want to analyze the asymptotics of vα as the θα
i converge to 1 (since the unique NE of our games are
determined by vα). Let us ﬁrst consider the simple case when θα
i = θα for all i. Then the random time T
becomes independent of the Markov chain and we get easily that prob(T = t) = (1 − θα)(θα)t.
Therefore
vα
i /yα = prob(iT = i)
=
P∞
t=0 prob(T = t)prob(it = i|T = t)
=
P∞
t=0 prob(T = t)prob(it = i)
=
P∞
t=0 prob(T = t)E[1 1i(it)]
= E[
P∞
t=0(1 − θα)(θα)t1 1i(it)]
where 1 1i is the indicator function of i: 1 1i(j) = 0 if j 6= i and 1 1i(i) = 1.
Recall that a sequence {at}t∈I N of real numbers is said to
i) Abel -converge to a if limθ→1
P∞
t=0(1 − θ)(θ)tat = a.
ii) Cesaro-converge to a if limN→∞ N−1 PN−1
t=0 at = a.
The Frobenius theorem (see, e.g., line 11 on page 65 of [5]) states that a Cesaro-convergent sequence is
Abel-convergent to the same limit. So, to analyse the limit behavior of vα
i , it is suﬃcient to consider the
Cesaro-convergence of {1 1i(it)}t∈I N.
The ﬁnite state-set I of our Markov chain can be partitioned into recurrent classes Iα
1 ,...,Iα
k(α) and a set
of transient states Iα
0 . Each recurrent class Iα
s is the support of a unique invariant probability measure µα
s.
If the Markov process starts within a recurrent class Iα
s (i.e., i0 ∈ Iα
s ), then the ergodic theorem states
that, for an arbitrary function f on I, N−1 PN−1
t=0 f(it) converges almost surely to Eµα
s [f].
If it starts at a transient state i ∈ Iα
0 , then we may deﬁne the ﬁrst time τ that it enters ∪s≥1Iα
s . Let
S be the index of the recurrence class iτ belongs to. The ergodic theorem also tells us in this case that
N−1 PN−1
t=0 f(it) converges almost surely to the random variable Eµα
S[f].
Let us deﬁne ˆ µα,i as the expectation E[µα
S], if i ∈ Iα
0 and as µα
s if i ∈ Iα
s (s ≥ 1). Then we clearly
get E[N−1 PN−1
t=0 f(it)|i0 = i] −→ Eˆ µα,i[f]. Therefore, denoting ˆ µα ≡
P
i∈I ξα
i ˆ µα,i, the Frobenius theorem
implies
Theorem 8. As θα tends to 1, vα
i converges to yαEˆ µα[1 1i] = yαˆ µα
i .
Corollary 2. Suppose that the graph of the underlying social network is undirected and connected. Further
suppose
θα




for all α ∈ A,i ∈ I and k,k0 such that wik > 0 and wik0 > 0 (i.e., all the nodes connected to i have the
same inﬂuence on i). Finally suppose that uα
i is invariant of i for all α (i.e., each company values all clients
equally), w.lo.g. uα
i = 1/|I| for all α and i. Then as θ tends to 1, the money spent at NE by a company on
any node is proportional to the degree of the node.
Proof: It is evident that the invariant measure is proportional to the degree. By Theorem 8, vα
i = vi
converges to the degree of i as θ tends to 1. But, by Section 4.5, mα
i is proportional to vi.
It might be useful to illustrate Theorem 8 with a simple example. Consider the network with four nodes,
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4 = 11. Nodes 3 and 4 are clearly absorbent: once reached by the process,
they become permanent. Nodes 1 and 2 are transient. Hence Iα
0 = {1,2}, Iα
1 = {3} and Iα
2 = {4}.
The invariant probability measure µα
1 (resp. µα
2) places all the weight on node 3 (resp. 4). Therefore,
ˆ µα,3 = µα
1 = (0,0,1,0) and ˆ µα,4 = µα
2 = (0,0,0,1)
Observing that prob(it+1 ∈ {3,4}|it = i) = 1/2, when i ∈ I0, we conclude that, if the process starts in
I0 at time 0, then the ﬁrst time τ it will reach {3,4} is a geometric random variable with parameter 1/2:
prob(τ = t) = 1/2t, t = 1,2,3,....
As above, let S denote the index of the recurrence class of iτ. When i0 = 1, then S = 1 whenever τ is an
odd number and S = 2 otherwise. Clearly,
prob(S = 2|i0 = 1) =
∞ X
k=1




and thus ˆ µα,1 = 2/3µα
1 + 1/3µα
2 = (0,0,2/3,1/3).
A similar argument shows that ˆ µα,2 = 1/3µα
1 + 2/3µα
2 = (0,0,1/3,2/3), since, if i0 = 2, then the event


















4 converge to 0,0,52/3 and 56/3.
Let us now deal with the general case where θα
i are not all the same. We will analyze the situation where
θα




i (θ) = 1, for all i (34)
θα








i < ∞ (36)
For simplicity, we also will assume that I = Iα
1 , i.e., there is just one recurrent class comprising all the nodes.
Theorem 9. Under (34), (35), (36), vα








as θ tends to 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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198 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: Since Cα is strictly increasing and convex, Cα(x) → ∞ as ||x|| → ∞. Thus there exists a scalar b such
that Cα(mα) > Uα(1,1,...,1) − Uα(0,0,...,0) whenever ||mα|| ≥ b. Deﬁne Sα = {mα ∈ RI
+ : ||mα|| ≤ b}.
Clearly, no ﬁrm α would spend more than b, for it then could be better oﬀ spending zero on every customer.
W.l.o.g. we may conﬁne α’s strategies to the compact convex set Sα.
Step 2: For any α ∈ A and j ∈ I, if m >> 0 then pα
i (mα,m−α) is concave and increasing in mα for
every ﬁxed m−α.
Proof of Step 2: Recall
pα














For brevity, say that a real-valued function h(mα,m−α,y) deﬁned on a vector space “has property (*)” if
it is concave and increasing in mα for every ﬁxed choice of m−α and y.
Note Fα
i (m,0) = Fα
i (mα,m−α,0) satisﬁes (*) by assumption AII. Assume Fα
i (m,pα
−i(m,t)) satisﬁes (*).
Then one may check that Fα
i (m,pα
−i(m,t + 1)) also satisﬁes (*). Indeed this follows from (38) and the
obvious fact that the function G(z,g(z)) is concave and increasing in z whenever both g and G are concave
and increasing.
Step 2 now follows from (37) and an obvious limiting argument.
Step 3: For  > 0, deﬁne the game Γ by truncating the strategy sets to S,α = Sα ∩ {mα ∈ RI
+ : mα
j ≥
 ∀j ∈ I}. Then Γ has an NE.
Proof of Step 3: Obviously pα
i (mα,m−α) is continuous in m ≡ (mα,m−α) and (by Step 2) concave in
mα. Moreover Uα is continuous, concave and increasing in all its variables by assumption AII. It follows that
Πα(m) = Uα(pα(m))−Cα(mα) is continuous in m and concave in mα. The existence of NE now follows from
the standard Nash argument [6].
Step 4: Let m() be an NE of Γ and select a subsequence n → 0 so that m(n) → m as n → ∞. Then
m is an NE of Γ.
Proof of Step 4: We need only verify that m is a point of continuity of the payoﬀ functions. This will
follow if mj 6= 0 for all j ∈ I. Suppose, to the contrary, mi = 0 for some i, i.e., mτ
i (n) → 0 for all τ ∈ A. Let
α and β be as in assumption (AIV). By going to a subsequence if necessary, assume mα
i (n) ≤ m
β
i (n) for all n.
Choose δn → 0 such that δn/mτ
i (n) → ∞ as n → ∞, for all τ ∈ A\{α} (e.g. take δn = max{
p
mτ
i (n) : τ ∈
F\{α}). Let α spend δn more on i. (This deviation is feasible for large enough n, since mα
i < b and δn → 0.)
The incremental cost of the deviation to α is at most Cα
+δn where Cα
+ is the maximum of the right hand
derivative of Cα evaluated at (see Step 1) the point (b,b,...,b). We will show that α’s gain in beneﬁt is strictly
more for small enough δn. Let pα(−),pα(+) ∈ RI
+ be the probabilities achieved before and after α’s unilateral
deviation to the extra expenditure δn. As shown in Step 2, pα(+) ≥ pα(−) component-wise. But, since Uα is
increasing, the gain in beneﬁt is at least B[pα
i (+) − pα
i (−)] where B = min{∂Uα(pα)/∂pα
i : pα ∈ [0,1]I} > 0
with ∂Uα/∂pα
i denoting the right-hand derivative of the concave function Uα. Now, denoting by δn ∈ R
I×A
+
the vector whose iαth component is δn and all other components are 0, we have
pα
j (+) − pα
j (−) = Fα
i (m + δn,pα









i (m + δn,pα
−i(m + δ)) − Fα
i (m + δn,pα
−i(m))
The term Fα
i (m + δn,pα
−i(m + δ)) − Fα
i (m + δn,pα
−i(m)) is non-negative by the assumption that Fα
i is
increasing and the fact that (see Step 2) pα
−i(m + δn) ≥ pα
−i(m). By AIV the term Fα




−i(m), is at least Kδn where K can be chosen arbitrarily large for small enough δn; in particular,
to ensure that BK > Cα
+. But then the gain in payoﬀ is at least BKδn which exceeds the loss Cα
+δn, for
small enough δn. This shows that α can beneﬁt from unilateral deviation at m(n), for small enough n,
contradicting that m(n) is an NE of Γn. We conclude that mi 6= 0 as was to be shown.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 9
It will be convenient to create a micro-model of how the decision Lt ∈ {Stop,Move} is taken in our Markov
chain. Before starting the Markov chain, one can, for each state i, consider an inﬁnite sequence of independent
decisions {Li
k}k=0,1,2,..., with prob(Li
k = Move) = θα
i (θ). Each time the process comes to state i the decision
to Stop or to Move is taken according to the ﬁrst unused decision Li
k. In other words, if Ni
t denotes the






Let then Ki denote the smallest k such that Li
k = Stop. Clearly Ki is a geometric random variable with
parameter θα
i (θ), so that, for an integer k, prob(Ki = k) = (1 − θα
i )(θα
i )k and P(Ki > k) = (θα
i )k+1.
The event {iT = i} coincides then with {∃t|Ni
t ≥ Ki & N
j
t < Kj,∀j 6= i}.
The ergodic theorem tells us that, as t goes to ∞, ni
t ≡ Ni
t/t converges almost surely to the random
variable Eµα[1 1i] = µα
i , where µα is the unique invariant measure ( I = I1).
Therefore, for all  > 0, there exists N such that prob(A) > 1−, where A ≡ {∀t > N,∀i ∈ I : |µα
i −ni
t| <
}. Deﬁne also B ≡ {Ki > N}. Then
prob(iT = i) ≥ prob({iT = i} ∩ A ∩ B)
= prob({∃t|tni
t ≥ Ki & tn
j
t < Kj,∀j 6= i} ∩ A ∩ B)
≥ prob({∃t|t(µα
i − ) ≥ Ki & t(µα









































,∀j 6= i}) − prob(Bc)
































































prob(iT = i) ≤ prob({iT = i} ∩ A ∩ B) + prob(Ac) + prob(Bc)
= prob({∃t|tni
t ≥ Ki & tn
j
t < Kj,∀j 6= i} ∩ A ∩ B) + prob(Ac) + prob(Bc)
≤ prob({∃t|t(µα
i + ) ≥ Ki & t(µα






j −,∀j 6= i}) + prob(Ac) + prob(Bc)
21Letting  go to 0 yields






























































As θ goes to 1, this also converges to (39) , which therefore is also the limit of prob(iT = i).
8.3 Cross eﬀects
We show that cross-eﬀects (of p
β
j on pα
i ) can be incorporated, under some constraints, in our general model
without endangering the existence of NE.
For α ∈ A, deﬁne the partial order
α
 on RI×A by:
x
α
 y if and only if ∀i ∈ I,xα
i ≥ yα





Assume that the contraction mapping F(m,p) can be written as F(m,p) = (1−θ)γ(m)+θG(p) where G
is non-expansive (this includes our quasi-linear model). Our assumptions on γ,G are:
AVII γα
i is concave in mα
i , ﬁxing m
−α
−i ; and is convex in m
β
i , for β ∈ A\{α}, ﬁxing m
−β
−i .
AVIII G is aﬃne and α-increasing (i.e., p
α
 p0 implies G(p)
α
 G(p0)).
(It can easily be checked that our canonical example satisﬁes AVII.)
Lemma 2. Assume that the utilities Uα are concave and increasing and that AVII, AVIII hold. Then
Uα(p(mα,m−α)) is concave in mα for ﬁxed m−α.
Proof: Indeed, if λ ∈ [0,1], if mα = λm0α + (1 − λ)m00α, then AVII implies
γ(mα,m−α)
α
 λγ(m0α,m−α) + (1 − λ)γ(m00α,m−α) (40)
Deﬁne inductively p0 = p0
0 = p00
0 = 0; pn+1 = (1 − θ)γ(mα,m−α) + θG(pn), p0
n+1 = (1 − θ)γ(m0α,m−α) +
θG(p0
n) and p00





0 + (1 − λ)p00
0. Now, suppose by induction that pn
α
 λp0
n + (1 − λ)p00
n. Then, since G is
aﬃne and satisﬁes AVIII, G(pn)
α
 G(λp0
n + (1 − λ)p00
n) = λG(p0
n) + (1 − λ)G(p00




n+1 + (1 − λ)p00
n+1.
Now observe that, as n goes to ∞, pn → p(mα,m−α), p0





 λp(m0α,m−α) + (1 − λ)p(m00α,m−α)
In particular, ∀i ∈ I: pα
i (mα,m−α) ≥ λpα
i (m0α,m−α) + (1 − λ)pα
i (m00α,m−α). Since Uα just depends on pα
and is increasing and concave, we get
Uα(pα(mα,m−α)) ≥ Uα(λpα(m0α,m−α) + (1 − λ)pα(m00α,m−α))
≥ λUα(pα(m0α,m−α)) + (1 − λ)Uα(pα(m00α,m−α))
Lemma 2 implies the existence of NE in the standard manner (see proof of Theorem 1).












ij ≥ 0 if β = α
w
αβ
ij ≤ 0 if β 6= α
Of course additional constraints need to be imposed on the w
αβ





ij ≤ 1 will suﬃce).
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